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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, and MURRAY CITY, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
~vs~ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body cor-
porate and politic of the 
State of Utah; DELMAR L. LARSEN, 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County; 
W. STERLING EVANS, Clerk of 
Salt Lake County, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to require Salt Lake County, and its 
County Clerk and County Sheriff to accept and serve legal docu-
ments, without charge, pursuant to the provisions of Section 
21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Bryant H. Croft of the Third Judicial District ruled 
that Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, exempted cities from 
paying fees to the clerk and the sheriff for filing and service 
of papers. The Lower Court, thus, granted Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Salt Lake City's, Motion for summary Judgment and denied 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Case No. 2300-16 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondent, Salt Lake City, seeks this Court 
to affirm the ruling of the lower court that cities are exempt 
from filing, and service fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cities have not been charged for filing civil papers or 
serving papers since 189 8 in any State court, including the Utah 
Supreme Court. In September of 1975, Salt Lake County notified 
Salt Lake City that they would start charging for these services 
and, in fact, did charge for the service. The City brought suit 
for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamas compelling the 
defendants to conform to the requirements of Section 21-7-2, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. Murray City was granted leave to inter-
vene as a party-plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH 
GOVERNS THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANY STATUTE. 
"In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative 
will is the all-important or controlling factor." 73-
Am.Jur. 2d, 'Statutes11, § 145. 
The Rules of Statutory Construction are designed for no 
other reason than to ascertain and declare the intention of the 
Legislature. 
"However, since all rules for the interpretation of 
statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object 
the discovery of the legislative intent, every technical 
rule as to the construction of a statute must yield to 
the expression of the paramount will of the legislature." 
• 73 Am.Jur. 2d, "Statutes", § 146. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This point was stated by the United States Supreme Court 
in one of the earliest cases setting forth what plan would be 
good for this Country: 
"And the intention of the Legislature, when discovered, 
must prevail, any rule of construction declared by previous 
acts to the contrary notwithstanding. Brown v. Barry, 
3 U.S. 365, 1 L.Ed. 638 (1797). (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also clearly stated this point 
in Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 112 U.116, 185 P.2d 
514 (1947). This Court observed: 
" . . . it is well to determine the purpose of the 
enactment. This is of importance in interpreting the 
act, as the purpose which underlies a statute is often 
regarded as speaking as plainly as the words forming the 
enactment." 
At the end of the opinion, the Court quoted Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction: 
11 r
 In the exposition of a statute the intention of the 
lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; 
and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict 
letter. When the words are not explicit the intention 
is to be collected from the context, from the occasion 
and necessity of the law; from the mischief felt, and the 
remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or pre-
sumed according to what is consonant with reason and good 
discretion.f" 
Therefore, the question before the Court in construing 
Section 21-7-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, becomes: What did the 
Legislature intend when they enacted the statute in question, and 
what does that statutory language provide?" 
POINT II 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 
STATUTE IN QUESTION LEAVES NO DOUBT CITIES ARE 
EXEMPT FROM PAYING COUNTY FILING OR SHERIFF 
SERVICE FEES, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The original provision governing fees, as passed at the 
First Session of the State Legislature, reads as follows: 
"The officers mentioned in this act are not in 
any case except for the State or a county, to perform 
any official services, except on cases of habeas 
corpus, and on such payment the officer must perform 
the service required.1' Laws of Utah, Chapter CXXXI, 
§ 161 (1896). (Emphasis added. 
The Court will note that only counties and the State were 
exempted from paying fees to the sheriff under this statute. 
In 189 8 this statutory provision was changed to read: 
"The state and county officers mentioned in this title 
shall not in any case perform any official service unless 
the fees prescribed for such service are paid in advance, 
and on such payment the officer must perform the service 
required; and for every failure or refusal to perform 
official duty, when the fees are tendered, any officer 
shall be liable upon his official bond; provided, that 
no fees shall be charged the state, or any county or sub-
division thereof, or any public officer acting theretor, 
or in cases of habeas corpus, or in criminal causes before 
final judgment, or for administering and certifying the 
oath of office, or for swearing pensioners and their 
witnesses, or for filing and recommending bonds for 
public officers." Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, Chapter 
7, § 1016. (Emphasis added) 
The language above quoted has remained the same and is the lan-
guage of the present statute, above quoted, despite revisions 
of the code in 1917, 1933, 1943 and 1953. 
This amendment was considered to be an important modification 
of the law. This point was stated by the Utah Code revision com-
mission notes of 1898. They said: 
11
. . . of the changes made by the commission and 
adopted by the legislature, the more important are 
as follows: . . . Amendment in fee bills; . . . " 
Preface to Revised Statutes of Utah 1898. 
One of the changes in "fee bills" was the inclusion of the phrase 
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l!or county or subdivision thereof11 in the exemptions. Thus, 
the Legislature deliberately amended the restrictive exemption 
of the former statute and included in its new law an exemption 
for any "subdivision11 of the State. Those word changes were 
considered important and must be given meaning. The only real 
question before the Court is to construe the legislative intent 
when it added to the exempt classifications a "subdivision" of 
the State or County. That is, was it the intent of the legis-
lative amendment to grant cities an exemption from county filing 
and service charges? 
In construing that intent, of great significance is the 
administrative interpretion placed on the amendment language 
for the past 75 years of its existence. The undisputed record 
shows that since 1898 no municipal subdivision has been charged 
for any fee, either to file civil complaints or for service of 
process. In fact, the undisputed facts show that the Supreme 
Court of Utah and the Third Judicial District Courts have not 
charged cities since 189 8 for court costs. Why? Because the 
contemporary clerks and judges were aware that the 1898 change 
in fee bills, included an exemption for cities. For over 75 
years, the persons charged with implementing legislative intent 
have consistently construed the statute to exclude cities from 
payment of fees. This Court has ruled that administrative 
interpretation is entitled to some consideration and may be 
regarded as persuasive. Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Anderson, 
30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d 217. 
Appellant submits 75 years of 'unswerving interpretation is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Significantly, no Legislature has changed this statutory 
language even though the Legislature has been aware of the 
administrative interpretation placed upon it by the Court Clerks 
and Sheriffs in every judicial district of this State. The 
Legislature in retaining the language, despite several recodi-
fications and knowledge of the administrative interpretations 
thereof, must be presumed to have adopted, if not intended, the 
result that cities are included in the exemption. 82 C.J.S. 
Statutes, § 370, p. 855, State Board of Land Commissioners v. 
Ririe, 56 U.213, 190 P. 59, State v. Hatch, 9 U.2d 288, 342 
P.2d 1103. 
POINT III 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 
21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, CLEARLY SHOWS THAT 
THE CITY IS EXEMPTED FROM THE PAYMENT OF FEES. 
The phrase "or any county or subdivision thereof" clearly 
relates back to the noun "State." The modifier is the whole 
word "State." Any other construction would make the word "sub-
division" surplusage and "duplicative of the word "County." 
The English sentence construction to arrive at the result 
Appellant urges would have to read "or any county and its 
subdivisions." ' 
The words chosen were chosen advisedly and under the "Last 
Antecedent Doctrine1' of Statutory Construction, qualifying 
words, phrases and clauses in a statute are applied to the word 
or phrase immediately preceding. This method of construction 
clearly shows that the phrase relates back to the word "State." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
CITIES ARE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Art. VI, § 26, of the Utah Constitution contains an enumera-
tion of prohibitions against the Legislature which enumerates 
the cities and counties; it provides: 
"The legislature may repeal any existing special 
law relating to the foregoing subdivisions, 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus, at the creation of the State and nearly contemporaneous 
with the passage of exemptions in fee bills, under discussion, 
the founders of this State considered municipalities subdivi-
sions of the State. 
The State statutes also consistently refer to cities as 
subdivisions -of the State of Utah. Some examples of this fact 
are: 
1. Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann. 1953, which defines 
cities as "political subdivisions." 
2. Section 51-3-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, which reads: 
"When the state or any county, city, town or other political sub-
division thereof . . ." (Emphasis added) The entire chapter 3 
of Title 51, is entitled "Accounts of Political Subdivisions." 
Any argument that claims the City is not a subdivision of 
the State implies that once a City is created by the Legislature, 
it becomes a "city-state." Our courts have repeatedly held 
that such a principle is not applicable in Utah; rather, our 
law clearly provides that all powers of cities are derived 
from the State. The State may change the powers of a city as 
long as the change is uniform for that class of cities 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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affected. Art. XI, § 5, Constitution of Utah, 
Thus, there can be no serious question that a Utah munici-
pality is a political subdivision of the State. 
POINT V 
SECTION'21-7-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, DOES 
NOT LIMIT THE EXEMPTION TO "LEGAL SUBDIVISIONS" 
OF A COUNTY AND ANY SUCH LIMITATION DOES NOT 
- NECESSARILY EXCLUDE CITIES FROM ITS TERM. 
Appellant urges the argument that the word subdivision as 
used meant "Legal Subdivision" of counties, as defined by Art. 
XI, § 1, Constitution of Utah. Appellant correctly described 
a rule of construction when he stated that each term of a, 
statute is considered to be used advisedly. The converse is 
also true. If a word is not used the omission should likewise 
be taken note of and given effect. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Anderson, 30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d 207 (1973). The word "legal" 
was not attached as a modifier for the word subdivision, show-
ing the Legislature used the term in its broad sense and did 
not limit it to "legal subdivision" of a county. It applied to 
the exemption to all subdivisions of the State. 
Besides straining the plain language of the statute to 
include a new word "legal," the argument of defendant-appellant 
is logically inconsistent. Appellant acknowledges that the 
words "Legal Subdivision" includes school districts and precincts. 
Further, as pointed out in Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision, 
Section 17-16-5,"Utah Code Annotated 1953, specifically states 
that cities are considered one precinct within the county; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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therefore, logically a city would be a legal subdivision of 
the county. This fact is true even under the classification 
Appellant urges. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that under any 
construction of the statute, the City is exempt from the filing 
and service fees. It is a subdivision of both the State and 
County within the meaning and intent of the statute in question. 
POINT VI 
CITIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE FINANCING AND OPERATION 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The City residents pay the same taxes as county residents, 
in addition to paying taxes to run city governments. The County 
itself is nothing more than its collective taxpaying citizens. 
County government does administer the funds and collect the 
taxes, but that is not sufficient distinction to require the 
City to pay service and filing fees for court actions. If it 
were, the County should rebate to the City the funds collected 
so that the City could pay the District Court and sheriff fees 
directly without causing our taxpayers to pay double for the 
same service a resident of an unincorporated area pays. 
The County courts are not restricted to non-incorporated 
areas and our citizens are entitled to have the City use the 
courts free of charge for the carrying out of governmental 
functions of the City. Each government is nothing more than 
an administrator to meet the taxpayer1s needs and to claim one 
should be an exempt government and the other not exempt is 
assinine when the taxpayers are one and the same. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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To refute this argument, Appellants point out that cities 
must pay for use of Federal Courts. Appellants fail to appre-
ciate that we have two different autonomous levels of govern-
ment in the United States, the State and the Central government. 
The Central government, commonly known as the Federal government, 
makes its courts open without fee for its governmental uses. The 
State government, specifically Utah, does the same by making its 
State courts available to its governmental subdivisions of which 
the cities are included, without payment of fees. 
We do not have different autonomous levels of government 
in Utah. All local governments in Utah derive their powers from 
the State and they cannot and do not claim the autonomy from the 
State that the States rightfully claim from the Central govern-
ment through Amendment X to the United States Constitution. 
SUMMARY 
It is submitted that 75 years of administrative interpre-
tation, as well as legislative history, show that cities are 
exempted under the provisions of Section 21-7-2, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, from payment of fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
GREG R. HAWKINS 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDED 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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